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AN ACE UP THEIR SLEEVE OR A HOUSE OF CARDS: 
CAN THE EPA's AFFORDABLE CLEAN ENERGY RuLE WITHSTAND CHEVRON 
DEFERENCE? 
By Shannon Zaret* 
T
he U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
(D.C. Circuit) is poised to become a prime battleground 
in a fight over the scope of the Environmental Protection 
Agency 's (EPA) authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions 
(GHGs) from the power sector under the Clean Air Act (CAA). 
The dispute stems from the EPA's recent efforts to replace the 
Obama-era Clean Power Plan (CPP) with the Affordable Clean 
Energy Rule (ACE Rule). 1 This move was quickly challenged 
by a coalition of twenty-nine cities and states as well as several 
prominent American health associations. 2 The two rules reflect 
very different views in regards to the role the federal government 
should play in combatting climate change, yet the core legal 
questions they pose are quite similar. To address pending 
litigation directed towards the ACE Rule, the D.C. Circuit will 
I ikely engage in a two-step inquiry. First, the court must examine 
whether the regulation of power plants under Section 112 of 
the CAA precludes their regulation under Section I \l(d). 3 If 
the court answers in the negative, they must then determine if 
the CAA sets limits on the EPA's statutory authority to regulate 
power plant GHG emissions. This Article will argue that the 
EPA's obligation under Section 112 does not displace their 
Section 11 l(d) authority and that the newly finalized ACE Rule 
represents a much narrower interpretation of Section 11 l ( d) that 
is inconsistent with the congressional intent of the CAA. 
BACKGROUND 
Untangling this knot requires a careful study of the 
CAA's history and its impact on EPA's regulatory authority 
under Section lll(d). As amended in 1990, the CAA included 
conflicting language in Section l 11 ( d).4 Due to an oversight, both 
the House and Senate passed versions that ended up in the final 
act. 5 The House version of the bill precluded the use of Section 
111 (d) to regulate pollutants " emitted from a source category . .. 
regulated" by Section 112.6 The Senate 's version , on the other 
hand, barred the use of Section l I l(d) to regulate air pollutants 
covered under 112.7 fn other words, the Senate version focused 
on barring the duplicative regulation of pollutants and did not 
preclude the regulation of the same source for different classes 
of pollutants.8 Although the House version was eventually 
codified,9 this discrepancy would spark major contention fifteen 
years later after the CPP was finalized on October 23 , 2015 .10 
Jn West Virginia v. EPA opponents of the CPP argued that 
the administration impermissibly relied upon the Senate version 
of the amended CAA, rather than the codified House version .11 
They contend that the text of Section 111 (d)( l) has only one 
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permissible interpretation and must be read as barring the 
regulation of any "source" regulated under Section J 12, even if 
in regard to an entirely different class of pollutants. 12 To win on 
the merits , opponents would have to demonstrate that the text 
is unambiguous and that no other reading of Section 111 (d)( I) 
could possibly be reasonable. 13 This is unlikely, as the EPA's 
authority to regulate GHGs from existing power plants under 
11 l(d) rests on extensive judicial precedent and is consistent 
with a long history of CAA precedents from both party 's 
administrations . 14 The argument also finds no support in the 
CAA's text, structure, or legis lative history.15 
ANALYSIS 
To this day, the issue has never been fully litigated. 16 It 
is unclear whether it will be raised in the pending ACE Rule 
litigation, but the court will likely address the greater ambiguity 
of Section 111 ( d) before tackling the current conflict. If it does, 
the court should examine the legislative history and statutory 
context which suggests that the EPA's authority to regulate 
GHGs under Section 111 ( d) does not stand in contention with 
their Section 112 authority. 
The second critical question is whether the EPA's authority 
to regulate power plant GHG emissions stops at the fence line. 
The answer is contingent upon the definition of "best system 
for emissions reduction" (BSER). 17 Section 111 of the CAA 
directs the EPA to establish emission standards for air pollutants 
based on what is achievable under EPA's determination of 
BSER. 18 The Obama-era CPP interpreted BSER broadly and 
encouraged states to go beyond the power-plant fence-line to 
reduce GHG emissions. 19 The Trump administration contends 
that the CPP exceeded the EPA's CAA authority and that Section 
I J l should be interpreted to apply to emissions reductions that 
can be achieved only by mandating controls , "applicable," or 
capable of being implemented at, the individual power plant.20 
A federal court will often accept an agency 's construction of an 
ambiguous statute they administer (i.e ., Chevron deference). 2 1 
ff the court determines the statute unambiguously grants EPA 
the authority to determine BSER as it did in ACE, then future 
administrations will be tied to this narrower interpretation of 
Section 11 l(d). Alternatively, if the courts find that the statute 
is ambiguous, they must then examine whether the ACE Rule 
is a reasonable interpretation or whether, under the standard of 
review, is arbitrary and capricious.22 
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The ACE Rule contains inherent flaws , suggesting the EPA 
has not identified the BSER for the power sector but rather just 
a system of emissions reduction . For example, the EPA excludes 
many emissions reducing technologies and restricts the definition 
of BSER to on-site, heat-rate efficiency improvements (HRl).23 
This approach paradoxically prevents greater reductions inside 
the fence and would actually raise emissions at some plants. 24 
Data from the EPA's own Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) 
projected that emissions under ACE would increase at eighteen-
percent of coal plants.25 
Further, the rule allows states to decide how significantly 
to cut emissions, if at all , rather than providing numeric targets 
for them .26 This would enable states to set weaker standards 
and prevents the EPA from measuring state progress towards an 
established goal. Lastly, EPAs RIA indicates that replacing the 
CPP with ACE will result in an increase in sulfur dioxide and 
nitrogen oxide emissions and an additional 4 70-1,400 premature 
death s compared to the CPP baseline.27 The RIA also concluded 
that the ACE rule would result in billions of dollars of net 
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"foregone benefits" and projected that GHG emissions would be 
3% higher in 2030 under every scenario analyzed.28 
CONCLUSJON 
Cumulatively, these issues restrict ACE from achieving 
maximum emission reductions both when compared to the 
more flexible CPP and even within their rigid inside the fence 
interpretation. This suggests that the EPA has not identified the 
BSER in the power sector and that there is room for the rule to be 
substantially broader. Whether the rule is arbitrary is something 
that the courts will ultimately resolve. However, courts should 
carefully evaluate these inconsistencies to determine whether 
ACE really represents the upper level of the EPA's authority 
to regulate GHGs or simply the bare minimum. If courts go 
with the latter option, they must reconcil e how this could be 
a permissible interpretation of "best systems" or a sufficient 
regulatory response given that the legislative intent of the CAA 
is to achieve targeted air quality standards to protect publi c 
health nationwide. ta~ 
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interpretations of the text in their response brief in West Virginia v. EPA. 
For example, the word " regulated" and the wha t that is being regulated 
is ambiguous here. The Supreme Court has directed the EPA to assign a 
"reasonable, con text-appropr iate meaning" to what is being regulated when 
the text ofa sta tute is ambiguous. See Ut il. Air Regulatory Grp. v. E PA , 
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